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The transfer of technology from developed to underdeveloped
economies invariably involves conflict between the supplier, the
recipient and the host state. The severity of this conflict of course
varies from situation to situation and few generalizations can be
made to cover all types of technology transfers in differing political
and economic environments.
Recognition of the existence of these conflicts is not to argue that
benefits are derived by the respective parties in the transaction. What
we are concerned to show here is that these conflicts are recognised
and that frequently they are explicitly covered in the agreement
governing the transfer.
The conflicting interests will be settled in the interests of the
dominant party in the transfer, (for this is the operational meaning
which is given to the concept of power). In a situation of unchanging
relative powers, such as in a wholly owned subsidiary secure from
threats of expropriation, etc., there may be no need to recognise
explicitly these conflicting interests. But where the relative power of
the various parties may change over time, it is usual that the conflicts
are made explicit. In this case it is in the interests of the initially
dominant party to attempt to 'freeze' the environment so that its
own interests are ensured in a changing environment. Conversely, the
initially weaker party will be concerned to make the agreement as
flexible as possible to allow for its growing power over time.
There are a wide range of instruments which the Head Office of the
technology supplier is able to use to enforce its power at the
subsidiary level. Some of these controls are fdrmally specified, and
others operate at the non-formalized level. Vernon sums up the
position with regard to wholly-owned subsidiaries: 'when a parent
expects to control its subsidiary effectively, formal restrictions are
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redundant; where they exist, the motivation is partly or wholly to
ensure against the possibility that the parent may one day lose
control of the subsidiary, through expropriation or otherwise. As
long as control is secure, however, a rational parent will not hesitate
to use the wholly-owned subsidiary for any purpose - consistent or
not consistent with the restrictions - provided that the use contri-
butes to the strategy of the system as a whole.' (Vernon; 1971 p.
135).
The position vis-a-vis joint ventures or management contracts is
different in the sense that controls have to be more carefully
specified, due to the greater likelihood of conflict with the host
partner or host state. In this case, it is in the interest of the
technology supplier to freeze the initial balance of power to avoid
the risk of decreasing relative dominance over time. In these
circumstances it is more usual to find that the instruments of control
are carefully specified in the agreement, and less reliance is placed by
the technology supplier on 'informal' control instruments.
We shall be looking at four types of formalized instruments of
control in the transfer of technology, while remaining aware that in
wholly owned subsidiaries, control may be exercised without
necessarily being formalized. The first of these instruments is the use
of specific contracts, such as management, sales and purchase
contracts. The second instrument is the memorandum and articles of
association of the joint venture. The third is the use of restrictive
clauses. The fourth concerns the legal status of the agreement. In the
case of the first two instruments, the discussion will take the form of
an examination of a joint-venture agreement in Zambia between the
host state and the Anglo American Corporation.
1. Agreed Contracts
Management purchasing arid marketing contracts vary in their scope
with the technical knowledge and managerial capability of the host
partner and the host state. We shall be examining a representative set
of management purchasing and marketing agreements agreed be-
tween the Government of Zambia and the Anglo American Cor-
poration, following the partial (51 per cent) nationalization of
Anglo's copper operations in Zambia in 1969.
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(i) The management contract1
The general duty of the management in this exclusive contract was
'towards the general management öf the Company's business and
specifically directed towards the optimization by the Company of
the production and profit'. No specification was made if there should
prove to be a conflict between output and profit (easily envisaged in
the extraction of variable grade ores) in the operation of the mines.
The company had the right to appoint the Managing Director. As
part of the agreement Anglo was to provide technical services which
inter alia include 'capital expenditure estimates'; short and long term
plans, viability studies and the like for maintaining, expanding or
improving operations and production; advise on 'operating problems'
and 'the scheduling of copper production'; 'recommend policy on
ore reserves and mining'; 'advise on research and development'; 'and
advise on and procure technical change'.
Anglo had also to provide General and Advisory Services with advice
inter alia, on production and marketing; preparation of financial
statements, reports and accounts; computer and management
services; and labour relations. Anglo was also to keep the joint
venture 'promptly informed of significant developments relating to
the mining and production of copper and cobalt throughout the
world of which Anglo is from time to time aware and the extent to
which such information is available for release.
'Anglo shall provide or procure the provision of senior staff as may
be required from time to time by the Company'. Any invention and
know-how resulting from the activities of this staff would be
available to the joint venture 'PROVIDED ALWAYS that the
Company . . . shall co-operate with Anglo.. . in procuring the
registration (for Anglo) . . . as licensee of all such Invention Rights,'
(their emphasis).
A number of prints emerge from this agreement, which reflected and
reinforced Anglo's dominant position in the joint venture. First,
Anglo controlled the flow of information to the host state with
regard to production, financial flows and technical change. Second,
1 of Zambia, 1970a.
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Anglo controlled the appointment of senior staff, and third, Anglo
obtained the property rights over technical change. When the man-
agement contract is read in association with the articles of associa-
tion, which provide Anglo with control over capital investment, the
strength of Anglo's position is plain.
(ii) The purchasing contract2
In this exclusive agreement Anglo undertook 'to negotiate and
conclude all arrangements for the supply and delivery of all goods
required by the Company and its subsidiaries at the best prices that
can be obtained, as well as to arrange transport, insurance and
clearing facilities.' While this agreement gives Anglo considerable
scope for transfer pricing if it so desires, there is a clause which
allowed Anglo to increase the commission costs if the agreement
appeared to result in an 'overall financial loss to Anglo'. Because the
price of copper is fixed at the London Metal Exchange, there is little
scope for transfer pricing at the output side of the operation3. It is
more likely, however, that if transfer pricing does occur it will be at
the input side. Notably, Anglo subcontracts the construction of new
pitheads to companies with which it is associated. The scope for
transfer pricing in the supply of intermediates is limited to some
extent by the small relative size of these intermediate purchases.
2. The Memorandum and Articles of Association
In this nationalization the Master Agreement (referred to as the
'Heads of Agreement'4 and the Memoranda and Articles of Associa-
tion cover much of the same ground. We will therefore confine
ourselves to a discussion of the Heads of Agreement (which
summarizes the other two agreements) in an attempt to show how
this, read in conjunction with the contracts discussed above, enabled
Anglo American to exert control over the important decisions in the
operation of the technology to mine and refine copper in Zambia.
With regard to the payment stream, the host state agreed that as long
as the twelve years bonds were outstanding, the mining operations
would not be subject to additional 'numerous taxes, export taxes,
2Government of Zambia, 1970b.
3This does not apply to the sale of some other outputs such as chemicals.
4Government of Zambia, 1969.
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income taxes, royalty payments, withholding taxes or any other
revenue measure'. No import duties on mining equipment, machinery
and supplies above the 'average' rate would be levied. No tax would
be paid on dividends to any shareholders, as long as the bonds were
outstanding. Finally, dividends were remittable free of Exchange
Control at IMF parity rates. Through these sets of arrangements
Anglo was able to control any adverse change in the payment stream
and ensured the free repatriation of earnings. Thus two of the major
areas of conflict had effectively been frozen and future control -
albeit for the period of time for which the bonds were outstanding -
remained with Anglo.
Affirmative votes of a majority of Anglo directors (five out of
eleven) were required on a number of actions of the joint ventures,
thereby giving an effective veto to Anglo on any of these issues.
These included:
(j) 'Any disposal of all or of any substantial part of the assets' - this
enabled Anglo to ensure that rival firms did not gain access to the
fruits of the operation.
Diversification into any 'substantially different' activities - this
partly enabled Anglo to maintain control over the use of the
surplus.
'Any new mining operation or facility or the expansion of an
existing mining operation or facility' which was not com-
mercially viable as judged by Anglo directors or the ability to
raise such funds on 'commercially competitive terms' - this
effectively enabled Anglo to control any attempt by the host
state to generate external economies.
'appropriations in respect of capital expenditure or expenditure
for exploration or prospecting' other than for operations agreed
to by Anglo directors.
(y) 'Any act, dealing, arrangement or transaction which, in the
opinion of a majority of the 'B' Directors, is not directed towards
and/or calculated to attain the optimization of production and
profit'. This clause allowed Anglo to control the host state in its
attempts to pursue its own broader strategic interests.
This memorandum and association of agreement, together with the
managerial, purchasing and marketing contracts discussed earlier can
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be related to five important areas of control. Control over entre-
preneurial decisions was effectively wielded through the veto of the
Anglo directors on diversification, expansion of production, etc., as
well as by the nature of the information which was passed on to the
joint venture in the management contract. At the same time, the
marketing contract and the directorial veto enabled Anglo to control
the supply of copper to potential competitors, thereby exercising
some tenuous control over accumulation by rivals in processing and
mining facilities.
Control over the organizational structure of the firm, while not a
particularly important area in a joint venture of this type, was once
again maintained by Anglo, partly through the veto of their direc-
tors, but largely through the management contract which gave Anglo
exclusive rights to gather and present operational data to the joint
venture.
The important area of financial control rested firmly with Anglo.
The payment stream was stabilized, recurrent (and capital) expendi-
ture was specified to 'commerically viable' activities not 'substan-
tially different' from present operations without Anglo directors'
approval and remittances of foreign exchange were guaranteed.
The staffing of senior positions was controlled by Anglo through the
management contract, and some control over the attitudes of senior
Zambian personnel was assured by an agreed programme of training
in other worldwide subsidiaries of the Anglo American Corporation.
Finally control over the inventive function was maintained in a
number of ways. The management contract gave Anglo the exclusive
right to provide technical and engineering services, and provision was
also made for the acquisition by Anglo of property rights over the
'Invention Rights' which may have resulted from R and D.
Anglo thus managed to obtain comprehensive control over the
operation of the technology, notwithstanding the acquisition by the
5 For a discussion of these see R. Kaplinsky, Accumulation and the Transfer of
Technology: Issues of Conflict and Mechanisms for the Excercise of Control, IDS
Discussion Paper no. 60, 1974.
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host state of the majority of the equity. This control followed largely
from the lack of manpower and know-how of the host state.6 The
expectation that the relative power of the host state over these
processes (which are vital for control over accumulation) would
increase over time, led Anglo to attempt to freeze the balance of
control for the twelve year period for which the bonds were
outstanding.
The preponderance of Anglo control was however recognised by the
host state and led the President to declare three and a half years later
that the payment of the bonds would be speeded up, thereby freeing
the host state from some of these controls. 'The effective control of
the industry', he declared, 'was vested firmly in the minority
shareholders'. (K. Kaunda, 1973).
In particular, he continued, this control had enabled Anglo American
and Roan Selection Trust (RST) to obtain financial advantages over
the use of foreign exchange and the restriction of taxes. The use of
profits had been confined to mining activities, and even this accumu-
lation had to be funded through borrowing, as the firms controlled
the use of profits and ensured that these were paid out as dividends,
rather than being reinvested. Finally the management and purchasing
contracts had led to the purchase of inputs from 'non-resident
companies for reasons best known to themselves, but not com-
prehensible to us'.
As a result, three actions were taken to switch control to the host
state. First, the bonds were to be redeemed immediately. This was
made possible by the unexpectedly high price of copper on the world
market. Presumably Anglo and RST, when the agreements were
reached, had not anticipated these high prices, and had banked on
the hope that a shortage of foreign exchange would preclude such a
step by the host state. Second, the three contracts were to be
revoked by giving the required two years notice, this meant that in
all 'Anglo' was able to maintain these agreements for a total of
almost six years - half of the period of the anticipated twelve years.
Third, the two firms were to be subject to normal tax provisions and
6M. Bostock and C. Harvey, 1972, M.L.O. Faber and J.G. Potter, 1971, C.
Harvey, 1972.
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exchange control regulations. Recently, the management, purchasing
and sales contracts have also been terminated1. If all of the expressed
aims are satisfied, a significant degree of control will have passed to
the host state. But this would imply a changed relative power over
the accumulation and operation processes, and there is as yet no
unambiguous evidence that the host state has a significantly greater
degree of control over either of these. It will be interesting to see
whether the President's statement expressed a fundamentally
changed balance of power or rather (as is suspected) the perception
of the real control of the host state with respect to the two
companies.
3. Restrictive Clauses
A wide variety of restrictive clauses can be used by the technology
supplier. As many underdeveloped countries have moved from
import substitution to export promotion policies, attention has been
focused on clauses restricting the scale or area of exports. The
Andean Pact Studies showed that of a total number of 247 contracts
in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, 200 had a total prohibition
on exports and a further 12 permitted exports only to certain areas
- only 35 allowed free exports of output (UNCTAD, 1972).
1The expected results of these actions with respect to the takeover of activities
were summarised by the Chairman of the Company in the 1974 Financial
Statement as follows: 'Consequently, Exchange Control regulations now apply
to the remittance of dividends to the external shareholders of RCM and our
Company. In addition, the ordinary dividends became, upon payment, subject to
deduction of withholding tax which is currently at the rate of 20 per cent. The
redemption of the outstanding Zimco bonds and loan stocks also made it
possible for the tax legislation in terms of which the mining companies received
loo per cent allowances for capital expenditure to be withdrawn at the end of
September 1973. Government is in the process of formulating new tax
legislation to replace that which was withdrawn last year. Pending the enactment
of such legislation, the charge for taxation has, with effect from ist October
1973, been calculated on the basis of the result that Nchanga stands to pay this
year an additional Ki6 million over and above what would have been payable
had the 100 per cent capital allowances been in force.' In addition the Zambian
Government (as 'A' shareholders) are responsible for the appointment of the
Managing Director. These claims should however not be accepted without
reservation. The Financial Times of 7 August 1974 suggests, for example that
the new marketing arrangements may make it difficult to maintain the existing
skilled expatriate marketing staff in Europe. In addition we have already
considered some of the mechanisms whereby technology suppliers can circum-
vent Government policies.
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But there are other widely used restrictive clauses. Vaitsos (1970),
showed how clauses restricting the sources of inputs were used to
transfer price profits from Colombia. Reference to other literature
on restrictive clauses will show that they are widely used, particularly
in joint ventures, in an attempt to exercise control in each of these
areas. We have evidence, for example, of restrictive clauses on
patents, prices, production of similar products, secrecy, quality,
volume of sales, hiring of personnel, etc. One particularly interesting
clause, from Spain, stipulated that if technical change were to emerge
from the subsidiary's operations in Spain, the property rights over
this technical change were to be held by the Head Office and the
Spanish subsidiary would have to pay royalties to the Head Office
for the use of the technology which it had itself developed!
4. The Legal Status of the Agreement
We have seen from our earlier discussion that two central concerns of
the technology supplier are to curtail the degree of risk involved in
the transfer and to freeze the balance of power at the date of
agreement if it is thought that a dominant position may be eroded
over time.
Both these objectives may be furthered within the framework of the
legal status of the agreement. The control mechanism here is to
freeze the environment at the date of agreement and to build into
this agreement heavy costs if the agreement is to be broken. In the
case of the Anglo American Government of Zambia agreement, a
clause was inserted which froze the legal environment at the date on
which the agreement was signed. That is, in the case of a recourse to
arbitration, ' . . . all disputes . . . shall be determined by the law of
Zambia (including its rules on the conflict of laws) as in force on the
date of execution of these Heads of Agreement disregarding all
legislation, instruments, orders, direction and court decisions having
the force of law in Zambia (other than those contemplated by these
Heads of Agreements) adopted, made, issued or given subsequent to
the date of execution of these Heads of Agreement.'
A similar clause appears in the Zambian Government's agreement
with RST, where in the case of disputes, the law of Zambia as of 24
December, 1969, 'disregarding all subsequent legislation, decisions,
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instruments, orders and directions having the force of law of Zambia
will be applied' (RST, 1970). Similarly in the agreement between the
government of Sierra Leone and the Sierra Leone Selection Trust
Ltd., which is part of the RST family, all disputes will be determined
'in accordance with the law of Sierra Leone (including its rules on
the conflict of laws) as in force on 31 March 1970 . . . notwith-
standing that such legislation instruments, orders, directives or
Courts decisions are stated or intended to come into effect retro-
spectively.' (Government of Sierra Leone, 1970).
This rather extraordinary clause has the effect of removing the
sovereignty of the host state with respect to the operation of the
technology. It is extraordinary not so much because it is unusual, but
because it is a loss of sovereignty which the respective host states
would not easily yield to the governments of powerful developed
countries, yet seem to yield to a private firm.
Having frozen the environment, the next object of the technology
supplier is to impose heavy costs on the host state or partner if it
wishes to break these agreements. In all three cases which we have
looked at, the arbitrating body is to be an arm of the World Bank.
Thus, in the Anglo American agreement, the host state agreed to
ratify The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and National of Other States. . . of the International
Centre for the Settlemeht of Investment Disputes of the World Bank
(ICSID).
The point of referring disputes of ICSID (or an equivalent body) is
that insofar as ICSID is an arm o the World hank, tailure to agree to
its arbitration may well lead to sanctions by the World Bank itself
and insofar as the Bank is a powerful body in the disbursement of
aid, this sanction would impose great costs to an underdeveloped
country.
Conclusion
In a situation of conflict, control is seldom derived from the specific
agreements which are drawn up between supplier and recipient.
Rather the formalized agreements represent the relative control of
the parties at the time of agreement. This relative power may not
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change over time, in which case there may be no need to make the
controls explicit. But where they do change, it is likely that the
conflicts which emerge will centre around the initial agreement.
We have focused our discussion largely on one particular set of
agreements, in the belief that it provides an insight into some of the
problems which emerge in the context of the changing relative
powers of suppliers and recipients of technology.
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